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IN FAVOR OF LAWS THAT ARE NOT CETERIS PARIBUS AFTER ALL* 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
I am generally taken to be an advocate of ceteris paribus laws throughout the sciences, 
even in physics. But what are ceteris paribus laws? According to John Earman, John 
Roberts, and Sheldon Smith, “The distinctive feature of ceteris paribus laws is that they 
do not entail any strict or statistical regularities in the course of events. Nor do they entail 
any predictions, categorical or probabilistic.”1 Earman, Roberts, and Smith also suppose 
that a ceteris paribus law is not “explicit about what precise conditions have to obtain for 
the regularity after the ceteris paribus clause to hold”2; alternatively that the ceteris 
paribus clause is “vague”3 and cannot be stated “in a precise form”4 or “a precise and 
closed form.”5  
If that’s what it takes, then what I have defended are not ceteris paribus laws.6 The laws I 
talk about either can be stated in precise and closed form or they entail strict or statistical 
regularities in the course of events or both. The matter hinges, of course, on what we take 
to constitute a “precise and closed” description. This returns us to the old issue of how we 
should police the language of science. I suspect that I am far less strict about what is 
admissible as a description than are Earman, Roberts, and Smith. My reason is that I find 
that the less restrictive language is the kind of language that is regularly employed in 
exact science; and that attempts to reconstruct this language away produce scientific 
claims that are at odds both with the ways we test our scientific theories and with the 
ways we put them to use.  
There are two kinds of formulation that I use to reconstruct scientific laws that I think 
Earman, Roberts, and Smith would reject, the first because of the language it uses, the 
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second because of the limitations it supposes on the descriptive power of theory. I shall 
discuss each in turn in sections 2. and 3. In section 4. I shall take up the issue of testing. 
What I say about testing will not only defend the kinds of laws I discuss but also ceteris 
paribus laws as more generally conceived. Section 5. answers some criticisms that 
Earman, Roberts, and Smith make in this volume against a connection I trace between 
induction and capacity. 
 
 
2. POWERS VS. CETERIS PARIBUS LAWS 
 
The language I use in reconstructing a number of scientific laws in the exact sciences 
(most notably physics and economics) is the language of powers, capacities or natures 
and related concepts such as interfere, inhibit, facilitate, and trigger. Those of us raised in 
the joint shadow of the Vienna Circle and British Empiricism were taught that these kinds 
of concepts must not appear in science. I was puzzled about this from early on since it 
seemed to me that many of the most important concepts I learned in physics are power or 
capacity concepts, force being the first, simple example.  
A big obstacle to debate here is the problem of characterization: what criteria distinguish 
capacity concepts from OK concepts? Surely we do not want to adopt the 
characterization of the early British Empiricists that OK concepts are those built out of 
ideas that are copied from impressions. Operationalization was on offer for a while, but it 
seems to cut too narrowly since it rules out many central theoretical concepts. Nor do I 
think we can be content with Carnap’s similarity circles and the Aufbau. 
In my own early attempts to understand these empiricist strictures, I proceeded 
differently, in a way that generally works best for ‘trouser’ words (that is, for concepts 
whose primary meaning comes from what they rule out): figure out what is supposed to 
be wrong with the illicit concepts; the OK ones are those that don’t have those problems. 
What then is supposed to be wrong with power concepts? One central worry comes from 
the fact that power concepts seem to be tied either too closely or too loosely to their 
related effects. This in turn is thought to lead to problems in testing claims about powers. 
I shall discuss these latter in section 4.  
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That powers and their effects are tied too closely was the complaint of the old 
Mechanical Philosophers against Scholastic concepts.7 What makes heavy bodies fall? 
Gravity. What is gravity? That which makes heavy bodies fall. For those like Ernst 
Mach,8 who wished to provide explicit measurement procedures for the concepts of 
physics, Newton’s second law seems to suffer the same difficulty. F = ma. What is it for 
a body of mass m to be subject to a total force of size F? A mass of size m is subject to 
force F iff its acceleration is a. 
On the other hand, when the power is not defined in terms of the occurrence of its effects, 
there seems to be no fixed connection between the existence of the power and the 
occurrence of its effects, neither strict (i.e., universal) nor statistical. Aspirins have the 
power to relieve headaches; that is surely consistent with the fact that they do not always 
do so and perhaps there is no fixed statistical relation either. This objection to powers 
echoes an objection that Earman, Roberts, and Smith make to ceteris paribus laws. 
There is a familiar way to fix this problem: insist that the effect is there after all whenever 
the power is.9 One well known case of this arises in discussions of the problem of evil.  
God is omnipotent: He has the power to create any kind of world at all. Couple this with 
the auxiliary assumption that He is all good. The effect to expect is a benign world, full 
of delights. Instead we see plagues and poverty and vice. One stock response is that the 
world is all good despite appearances. We simply fail to see or perhaps to understand the 
situation properly. I take it that this kind of claim must be judged unacceptable by 
standards employed in successful science. The world does not appear good; it does not 
pass any of the standard tests for being good; and its effects are not the effects we are 
entitled to predict from a world of virtue and perfection. 
Or consider Freudian claims, which we know distressed many followers of the Vienna 
Circle. Consider a crude version of one Freudian example. Freud maintained that the 
childhood experiences that the Ratman sustained have the power to make one desire the 
death of one’s father. Freud says: “... he [the Ratman] was quite certain that his father’s 
death could never have been an object of his desire but only of his fear ... According to 
psychoanalytic theory, I [Freud] told him, every fear corresponds to a former wish which 
was now repressed; we were therefore obliged to believe the exact contrary of what he 
had asserted ... He wondered how he could possibly have had such a wish, considering 
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that he loved his father more than any one else in the world.”10  But the Ratman did not 
recognize this desire in himself, he appeared to others as a loyal and loving son and he 
had behaved just like someone concerned to ensure the welfare and safety of his father. 
But that’s alright on Freud’s view. The desire is really there; it is just unconscious and 
thus does not manifest itself in the usual ways. 
Turn now to what Earman, Roberts, and Smith call “special force laws”, like the law of 
universal gravitation (A system of mass M exerts a force of size GMm/r2 on another 
system of mass m a distance r away) or Coulomb’s law (A system with charge q1 exerts a 
force of size ε0q1q2/r2 on another system of charge q2 a distance r away).11 These are not 
strict regularities. Any system that is both massive and charged presents a 
counterexample. Special forces behave in this respect just like powers. This is reflected in 
the language we use to present these laws: one mass attracts another; two negative 
charges repel each other. Attraction and repulsion are not among what Ryle called 
‘success’ verbs.12 Their truth conditions do not demand success: X can truly attract Y 
despite the fact that Y is not moved towards X. 
But perhaps, as with the delights of our universe or the Ratman’s desire for the death of 
his father, the requisite effects are really there after all. Earman, Roberts, and Smith feel 
that the arguments against this position are not compelling. I think they are: the force of 
size GMm/r2 does not appear to be there; it is not what standard measurements generally 
reveal; and the effects we are entitled to expect – principally an acceleration in a system 
of mass m a distance r away of size GM/r2 – are not there either. 
Contrast a different case.13 In simultaneous equations models in economics each equation 
is the analogue of a special force law: each describes the operation of a single cause. 
When more than one cause is present, all the equations must be satisfied at once. So the 
pattern of behavior that occurs is one consistent with each equation separately. Unlike 
mechanics, the ‘special force laws’ in economics really are strict regularities (if true at 
all). The effects demanded by each law separately are really there – and they meet 
standard requirements for doing so: the effects of each appear to be there; standard 
measurements reveal them; and the effects of these effects are the ones we are entitled to 
expect. 
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The price level in economics is a contrast. It is calculated by summing the ‘contributions’ 
of a variety of different causes. But we do not want to think of the price level as literally 
composed of a lot of distinguishable parts as a wall is composed of its stones – the level 
from w to x is that due to the stock of money; from x to y, that due to the velocity of 
money; etc. This seems a highly unnatural reading to me. And it seems even more so 
when we move to engineering examples – say the construction of complex machines 
from simple ones or of circuits from combinations of resistors, capacitors and 
impedances – where the rules for how to calculate what happens when the parts act 
together are not by simple addition as they are in the case of force or price level. 
Kevin Hoover in his extended study Causality in Macroeconomics backs up my point by 
criticizing the assumption of linearity of causal influences; that is, the assumption that 
“the influence of Y can be added to the influence of M and so forth”14 in calculating their 
effect when operating jointly. (In Hoover’s example, Y is income, M, money and the 
effect is the interest rate.) Hoover complains, “But linearity is unduly restrictive.”15 
Hoover is particularly concerned with the non-linearities arising from rational 
expectations theory, which imply that the influences of macroeconomic causes cannot be 
calculated just by addition. He illustrates with a mechanical example: 
A gear that forms a part of the differential in a car transmission may have the 
capacity to transmit rotary motion from one axis to another perpendicular to it… 
The capacity of the differential to transmit the rotation of the engine to the 
rotation of the wheels at possibly different speeds is a consequence of the 
capacities of the gear and other parts of the differential. The organization of the 
differential cannot be represented as an adding up of influences nor is the manner 
in which the gear manifests its capacity in the context of the differential 
necessarily the same as the manner in which it manifests it in the drill press or in 
some other machine ...16 
Does all this matter? Pretty clearly it does not matter to the economics or to the physics 
under discussion. But it does matter to the metaphysics, particularly to the topic under 
discussion here – ceteris paribus laws. To see why let me explain how I see the 
difference between physics and many of the human sciences.  
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We study capacities throughout the sciences. Many of the central principles we learn are 
principles that ascribe specific capacities to specific features that we can independently 
identify, from the capacity of a massive object to attract other masses to the capacity of 
maltreatment of a child to cause that child to maltreat its own children, or, to mention the 
example that Earman, Roberts, and Smith discuss in their paper in this volume, the 
capacity of smoking to cause lung cancer.  
What is special about physics then? Not that it does not offer knowledge about powers or 
capacities but rather that it has been able to establish other kinds of knowledge as well, 
knowledge that we can couple with our knowledge of capacities to make exact 
predictions. This additional knowledge is primarily of two kinds: 1) We know for the 
powers of physics when they will be exercised (e.g., a massive object always attracts 
other masses); and 2) we have rules for how to calculate what happens when different 
capacities operate together (e.g., the vector addition law for forces). This kind of 
knowledge is missing for many other subjects. That is why they cannot make exact 
predictions.17  
Now for ceteris paribus laws. Consider Earman, Roberts, and Smith’s example 
(S) CP, smoking causes lung cancer 
of which they say, “If some oncologist claims that (S) is a law, then, we maintain, there is 
no proposition that she could be expressing…”18 I disagree. I take it that the proposition 
she is expressing is  
(S’) Smoking has the capacity to cause lung cancer. 
a claim exactly analogous to the special force laws of physics. This is a precise claim: it 
states a matter of fact that is either true or not; it is not vague; and it has no ceteris 
paribus clause that needs filling in. So it does not suffer from those faults Earman, 
Roberts, and Smith ascribe to ceteris paribus laws. More central to their objections, it is 
testable, it makes predictions, and it entails regularities in the course of events, in this 
case statistical regularities. This is the topic of section 4. 
 
 
3. THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGES 
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In the discussion so far I have been more liberal in my reconstruction of the language of 
science than most modern empiricists. I allow it to cover more, to talk about powers and 
capacities. Now I shall propose a way in which I think the languages of the different 
sciences can describe less.19 
Consider Newton’s second law, F = ma. What does it say? Many, probably including 
Earman, Roberts, and Smith, take it to describe a strict regularity. I think that it does so 
only conditionally. The claim we are entitled to believe from the vast evidence in its 
favor is this: if nothing that affects the motion operates that cannot be represented as a 
force, then … The two views collapse together if all causes of motion can be represented 
as forces. Why do I think many might not be? 
Newtonian mechanics, like many other theories in physics, has, I believe, very much the 
structure that C. G. Hempel taught us theories have.20 It consists of internal principles, 
such as Newton’s three laws of motion, which give relations among the central concepts 
of the theory, and bridge principles, which constrain how some of the concepts of the 
theory are applied. Many early logical positivists hoped that the bridge principles would 
lay out direct measurement procedures for all the concepts of the theory. They had to 
settle for less. The bridge principles match some theoretical concepts with concepts 
‘antecedently understood’.  
In the case of Newtonian mechanics the primary bridge principles are the special force 
laws. These license a particular theoretical description – e.g. ‘… is subject to a force F = 
GMm/r2’ or ‘… is subject to a force F = ε0q1q2/r2’ – given a description in the vocabulary 
of masses, distances, times and charges – e.g. ‘… is a mass m located at distance r from a 
mass M, or ‘… is a charge q1 located at distance r from charge q2’.21  
Bridge principles provide strong constraints. The theoretical descriptions – in our 
example the individual force functions from the special force laws – are allowed only if 
the corresponding descriptions in ‘antecedently understood’ terms are satisfied.22 (For 
example, “The force on a mass of size m is GMm/r2 if and only if m is a distance r from a 
body of mass M”.) The same thing is true of quantum mechanics and its bridge principles 
as well as quantum field theory, quantum electrodynamics, classical electromagnetic 
theory and statistical mechanics.  
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It is because of the issue of evidence that I urge that the bridge principles of these 
theories are so strongly constraining. I have looked at scores of applications and tests of 
the theories in my list, applications and tests of the kind that we take to argue most 
strongly for the truth of these theories. In these cases the theoretical terms that have 
bridge principle are invariably applied via the bridge principles. This interpretation of the 
demands of bridge principles in turn puts a strong constraint on the descriptive power of 
the theory. Force functions can be legitimately applied only to situations that are 
described in bridge principles. Similarly for quantum Hamiltonians, classic electric and 
magnetic field vectors, and so on. 
Can all causes of motion be correctly described using just the descriptions that appear in 
the bridge principles of Newtonian mechanics? To all appearances, not. We have millions 
of examples of motions that we do not know how to describe in this way. Consider one 
case where we eventually were successful. For centuries we knew about electricity and 
magnetism: e.g. rubbing a glass rod against cat fur can cause human hair to move; 
loadstones can move iron filings; and so forth. But we could not add these in as forces in 
Newton’s second law. Eventually we evolved the formal, precise concepts of electric and 
magnetic charge as well as the bridge principles that assign them force functions. In so 
doing we came to ringfence a host of macroscopic situations from all the rest of those that 
could cause motion but that we could not describe in Newtonian theory: these are ones 
involving attraction or repulsion between electrically or magnetically charged objects. 
But what of the vast remainder? 
We have succeeded in applying Newton’s second law to a vast, vast number of cases – 
but always of the same kinds: the ones that appear in our bridge principles. And there are 
still not many bridge principles included in Newtonian mechanics, even after 300 years.23 
We are not constantly expanding the theory, regularly producing new bridge principles to 
meet either new cases or the old familiar ones. Nor do we have continuous success in 
bringing these cases in under the old bridge principles. This suggests that these cases may 
well not fall under any descriptions for which there are force functions. And a handful of 
striking successes does not discount this worry.  
My conclusion from these kinds of considerations is that we need to add to the basic 
‘equations of motion’, like F = ma or Schroedinger’s equation, a special constraining 
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condition: The equation holds so long as everything that can affect the targeted effect is 
describable in the theory. This is the formulation of the law that we have strong evidence 
for. Notice that it is in ‘precise and closed form’ and hence does not look like a ceteris 
paribus law on one of the criteria of Earman, Roberts, and Smith. But how do we test it? 
 
 
4. TESTING 
 
How do we test my version of Newton’s second law or the Schroedinger equation? In 
exactly the same way that we would test them if they had no condition attached. The 
same is true mutatis mutandis for capacity ascriptions and for certain kinds of more 
conventionally rendered ceteris paribus laws. Although there are important differences, 
let us for the sake of brevity lump all these together and consider them to be of the form, 
‘If nothing interferes, then ... (some strict or statistical regularity).’24 
Suppose we wish to test F = ma in its unconditional form. We set up a number of 
different kinds of situations to which, using our bridge principles, we would naturally 
assign some specific force function. For instance we arrange two bodies of charges q1, q2 
and masses m1, m2 a known distance r apart so that we can assign the force function 
Gm1m2/r2 + ε0q1q2/r2 directed between them. We ensure as best we can that the situation 
does not explicitly meet any of the other descriptions to which we know how to assign 
force functions. Then we also ensure as best we can that there is nothing else about the 
situation that might be assignable a force function – there is no significant wind, no 
trucks rumbling by, no bright lights, … Finally we look to see if the motions that occur in 
all these situations match those predicted from the equation. 
Suppose instead that we wish to test ‘If nothing interferes with the operation of the force, 
F = ma.’ Everything in the description of what we do will be identical to the previous 
description except for five words. We substitute for the sentence ‘Then we also ensure ...’ 
a new one: ‘Then we also ensure as best we can that there is nothing else about the 
situation that might interfere with the force’s operation.’ And what we actually do to 
ensure this is the same in both cases. 
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‘But,’ one may ask, ‘how do we know what to eliminate in the second case?’ I think the 
question is more appropriately ‘How do we know what to eliminate in the first case?’ We 
do not look for features that figure in our bridge principles as we did in setting up the 
basic part of the experiment. Of course people who believe in the unconditional form of 
the law will assume that the features we are looking for are exactly the other things in the 
situation that can be assigned force functions. But that does not supply them with a 
method for picking these features out.  
Here’s what I think happens. We have seen a vast number of cases of forces at work to 
which we have tried to fit Newton’s second law and over time we have established very 
strong rules of thumb about what can make trouble for it. That is, we have learned from a 
lot of experience what kinds of things might interfere with the operation of the force. 
That’s what we control for. 
Earman, Roberts, and Smith might think my testing strategy lets in too much. They 
consider what might seem an analogous reading of ceteris paribus laws: 
It has also been suggested that we can confirm the hypothesis that CP, all F’s are 
G’s if we find an independent, non-ad-hoc way to explain away every apparent 
counterinstance… But this could hardly be sufficient. Many substances that are 
safe for human consumption are white; for every substance that is white and is not 
safe for human consumption, there presumably exists some explanation of its 
dangerousness … but none of this constitutes evidence that CP, white substances 
are safe for human consumption.25 
The reading that Earman, Roberts, and Smith offer for ceteris paribus laws is an excellent 
attempt at the logical positivist program of substituting acceptable formal-mode concepts 
for dicey material-mode ones. For example: X causes Y becomes X explains Y, which in 
turn becomes Y can be derived from X given the claims of our theory. Here we have 
analogously: X interferes with (x)(Fx ? Gx) becomes X explains why a, which is F, is not 
G, which presumably in turn becomes Ga can be derived from X given the claims of our 
theory (and perhaps Fa as well). 
The rendering is a good try, but it does not work, as we can see from Earman, Roberts, 
and Smith’s own example. It does not work for very much the same reason that the 
analogous formal-mode rendering of causation does not work. You can’t get causality 
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and its associated family of concepts out of laws unless the laws themselves are causal 
laws, not just laws of association, in which case the program of replacement fails 
anyway.  
Moreover, the program is misguided to begin with. There is nothing unacceptable about 
the concepts of causation and interference. They are well understood, claims about them 
are testable and, as G.E.M. Anscombe argues,26 some causal relations are directly 
observable; or, more guardedly, causal concepts do not systematically fare worse in any 
of these respects than other concepts.  
We have, I maintain, ample reason to think that there is as much a fact of the matter about 
whether it is a causal law that forces cause motions as there is about whether it is a law 
that F = ma; that there is as much a fact of the matter about singular causal claims as 
there is about other relational claims; and as much a fact of the matter about whether X 
interferes with some process as about whether the process itself obtains. 
The drawback to interference is not that there is something wrong with it ontologically; it 
is rather that we often have epistemic problems. First, we often cannot tell just by looking 
that X is interfering with Φ, though even this is not always the case. (Sometimes, for 
example, it is easier to tell that you are, for example, interfering with someone’s work 
than to tell that they are working. My friends Anne and Sandy, for example, sit at their 
computers typing just as I do now for fun.) Usually to make judgements about 
interference, we need to have a lot of specialized knowledge and a lot of experience; you 
can’t just tell by looking. 
Second, it seems that in most cases there are no systematic rules linking X interferes with 
Φ to other descriptions in some special vocabulary that we prefer epistemically (unless 
the vocabulary is itself heavily laden with concepts that already imply facts about 
causality, such as pushing, attracting, shielding …). We almost never have ‘special 
interference laws’ to tell us in, say the language of masses, charges, distances and times, 
when something interferes with something else in the way that we have special force laws 
to tell us when a particular force function obtains.  
We should note though that the absence of ‘special interference laws’ is not so 
epistemically damaging as many suggest. The special force laws do tell us when a 
particular force function obtains, but only for very specific descriptions – the descriptions 
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that appear in our bridge principles. For other descriptions that may be applied far more 
immediately, such as a truck passing by or the press of the wind, we are just as much on 
our own without the help of a system of rules as we are in deciding if we can label the 
truck passing by as an interference. 
There are four facts I would like to underline: 
1) The lack of systematic rules does not mean that we cannot have knowledge about 
whether a certain kind of occurrence constitutes an interference. Galileo after all 
knew to use smooth planes for his rolling-ball experiments because he knew he 
should eliminate the interference of friction with the pull of the earth. Similarly he 
knew to drop small compact masses and not feathers from the Leaning Tower. And 
that was long before he could have had any idea whether friction or the wind exerted 
a force in the technical Newtonian sense. 
2) The fact that we cannot identify what counts as interference with respect to a claim Φ 
does not mean that we cannot test whether Φ is true or not. Consider Aspirins relieve 
headaches, if nothing interferes. We regularly test claims like this in randomized 
treatment/control experiments. 
3) Nor does it mean that is it is too easy to dismiss disconfirmations.27 When the 
predicted result fails to transpire, one can always say that something interfered. But 
saying does not make it true. And as epistemologists are always reminding us, saying, 
even when it is true, does not constitute knowledge, or even reasonable belief. We 
need a good reason for claiming that something is an interference. When we do not 
have any idea whether a nominated factor is an interference or not, then we equally 
have no idea how to classify the case. Our intended test is no test at all. 
4) It follows that one needs a great deal of information about what might and might not 
interfere with a process before we can carry out serious tests on the process and that 
in turn means that we need already to have a great deal of information about the 
process itself. That just means that science is difficult, as we already knew, and that it 
is hard to get started in a vacuum of knowledge.  
 
 
5. CAPACITIES AND INDUCTION 
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 In Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement28 I offer a number of defenses of 
capacities: 
a) Once we have rejected Hume’s associationist view of concept formation, there is no 
good argument against the family of concepts connected with causes and capacities. 
b) Strengths of capacities29 are measurable, just as is the strength of the electromagnetic 
field vectors or the energy of a system.30 
c) We commonly use the analytic method in science. We perform an experiment in 
‘ideal’ conditions, I, to uncover the ‘natural’ effect E of some quantity, Q. We then 
suppose that Q will in some sense ‘tend’ or ‘try’ to produce the same effect in other 
very different kinds of circumstances. (What I mean by ‘in some sense’ is that the 
rules for calculating what happens when a number of factors with different ‘natural’ 
effects operate together will differ according to subject matter. Recall the examples of 
such rules in section 2.31) This procedure is not justified by the regularity law we 
establish in the experiment, namely ‘In I, Q ? E’; to adopt the procedure is to 
commit oneself to the claim ‘Q has the capacity to E’. 
 
In The Dappled World32 I add another. With the use of capacity language we can provide 
a criterion for when induction is reliable. This, I maintain, cannot be done with the use of 
OK properties and strict regularities alone. Earman, Roberts, and Smith object to this 
claim. This is not surprising because they also reject one of its major premises. 
Imagine we set up a very complex and delicate design, D, an ideal experiment, to observe 
the precession of a gyroscope in order to test relativistic predictions about the effects of 
space-time curvature on precession. The result is R. To the extent that we believe our 
design is a good one and that we have implemented it properly, we expect that that result 
should be repeatable in just that experimental set-up, i.e. we believe that D ? R is a strict 
regularity.  
What does it mean that ‘our design is a good one’? That is, what criteria must D satisfy if 
R, which occurs on one occasion of D, is to occur whenever D occurs? The crude answer 
is that D must control for all factors relevant to R. I read this as ‘D is an arrangement in 
which the capacity of the space-time coupling to produce precession R operates 
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unimpeded.’ Those who do not like capacities will try other ways to explain relevance. I 
imagine they look to strict regularities and consider two levels at which they might look. 
First, at a concrete level. Look through all the strict regularities involving very concrete 
features that have R as a consequent. All and only factors that occur in the antecedents of 
these are relevant and should be controlled for. My objection to this strategy is not that 
the list is too long but rather that it will not provide the information we need. Almost 
anything can appear in one of these laws, depending on the arrangement of the other 
factors; we could design our experiment in indefinitely many ways and still expect the 
result R. Any feature that was essential to any of these designs gets counted as relevant. 
Moreover, the long list of regularity laws with R in the consequent will not fix how a 
relevant factor should be controlled for. That will depend on the actual design, D.33 So 
lists of strict regularities at a very concrete level cannot provide a criterion that D must 
satisfy if its results are to be repeatable. 
A more plausible proposal is to look at a more abstract level, as Earman, Roberts, and 
Smith propose. The abstract formula for precession is 
 
Precession:  d(nrn)/dt = Γr ns /ωs  
 
This formula suggests that an adequate criterion is, ‘Eliminate all sources of torque (Γ) 
except that arising from the space-time coupling as well as all sources of variation in the 
gyroscope’s moment of inertia (I) and in its spin angular velocity (ω)’. Let us concentrate 
on the torque, as Earman, Roberts, and Smith do. They suggest that we couple the 
formula for precession with ‘the laws relating force to precession and various special 
force laws’ to fix what D must be like. What is wrong with that from my point of view? 
Two things – the first familiar from section 2. and the second from section 3. 
1) The special force laws are not strict regularities among OK features.34 
2) As with Newton’s second law, we do not have sufficient evidence to ensure that the 
precession law can be read as a strict regularity. (A more cautious rendering includes 
a condition: “If nothing that cannot be described as a torque (or a variation in I or ω) 
interferes, then ….”) 
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In their discussion in this volume Earman, Roberts, and Smith deny 1), as we have seen. I 
suspect they would also deny 2). I have explained why I disagree with them. But if we 
grant either of these assumptions, we see that the job cannot be done with strict 
regularities alone. We need capacities. The generalization “D ? R” is reliable because D 
is a kind of situation in which a stable capacity (the capacity of space-time curvature to 
affect precession) operates without interference.35  
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1 Earman et. al (XXX), p. 22; see also p. 18 where they advocate that “nature is governed by laws and that 
these laws entail strict regularities that are true throughout space-time”. 
2 Ibid., p. 5 XXX. 
3 Ibid., p. 22 XXX. 
4 Ibid., p. 22 XXX. 
5 Ibid., p. 8 XXX. 
6 I do not mean to imply that I am opposed to them; simply that they are not the kinds of laws I have been 
thinking about and defending over the last decade. 
7 Cf. Glanvill (1661).  
8 Mach (1893).  
9 Or, to be more fair to the proponent of powers, ‘whenever the power obtains and the circumstances are 
propitious for its exercise.’ 
10 Freud (1909), p. 39.  
11 Note that throughout I take the special force laws to ascribe forces and not motions to situations. 
12 Ryle (1949). 
13 See Cartwight (1989), ch. 4.  
14 Hoover (2001), p. 55.  
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15 Ibid., p. 55.  
16 Ibid, p. 55f.  
17 But they often can make rough predictions or give good advice. 
18 Earman et. al, (XXX), p. 26 XXX. 
19 For a more detailed discussion see Cartwright (2000).  
20 Hempel (1966).  
21 For purposes of this section we can remain neutral about my claim in Section 2. It does not matter for the 
points here whether we take the special force laws to ascribe capacities of a certain types or instead to 
ascribe an actually existing force. 
22 There are two caveats here. First, it can happen that exactly the same vectorial quantity F that normally is 
associated with one force law applies to a situation ‘by accident’ even when it does not satisfy the requisite 
description because of the particular values of the force properly ascribed to the situation by other special 
force laws. Second, I would like to remain neutral about how strict we need to be about when ‘the 
description offered in the bridge principle is satisfied.’ 
23 Paul Teller (personal communication) has objected to my claim that in quantum mechanics there are only 
a small number of bridge principles by pointing out that, as I myself urge, there are a good many 
‘derivative’ bridge principles. These, however, almost never expand the scope of the theory, but rather 
contract it. For they are in fact, as their name says, derived.  
We start with a situation modeled with a combination of descriptions available from our basic bridge 
principles. Then we add more facts about the situation to derive a new force function for it, by limiting the 
original force function. The derived bridge principle then provides force functions for only a subset of cases 
that the original did. Of course sometimes we make approximations as we go along. But that, if anything, 
narrows the scope of the force function even more. For now it is no longer true even of the originally 
described situation but only of some approximation to it. 
24 In the case of the equations of motion, as we have seen, the caveat really refers to factors not describable 
in the language of the theory. Setting aside some niceties, we can assume that capacity claims of the form 
“A has the capacity to Φ” imply that if nothing interferes A will Φ; and probabilistic ascriptions “A has 
capacity of strength r to Φ”, to imply roughly that if nothing interferes the probability that A will Φ is r. 
But, as I have argued in Cartwright (1999) capacity ascriptions can say a lot more as well. 
25 Earman et. al. (XXX), p. 24 XXX. 
26 in her (1971).  
27 For a recent example of this kind of claim specifically in the context of the capacity laws I defend see 
Winsberg et. al. (2000). 
28 Cartwright (1989).  
29 This includes their presence or absence. 
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30 We cannot, of course, tell by the measurement itself that what we are measuring is a real capacity, 
anymore than we can tell by the procedures for measuring the electric field strength that what we are 
measuring is a real quantity. In both cases that requires a lot of theory. 
31 In Cartwright (1999) I argued that nature might not have always provided such rules. Even in that case 
there is a cash value to knowledge about the capacity. The associated effects are more likely to occur when 
a feature with the appropriate capacity is present than when no such feature obtains. (Consider using a 
magnet to pull a pin from between the floorboards. It is a good idea to try the magnet even should there be 
no fixed rules for what happens to the pin in just exactly that combination of circumstances.) 
32 Cartwright (1999).  
33 In my (1988) and (1989) I give examples where two different laws employ the same factor in different 
ways. 
34 This is the assumption that figured in the arguments of my (1999), p. 95, where I concluded, “The 
regularity theorist is thus faced with a dilemma. In low-level highly concrete generalizations, the factors are 
too intertwined to teach us what will and what will not be relevant in a new design. That job is properly 
done in physics using more abstract characterizations. The trouble is that once we have climbed up into this 
abstract level of law, we have no device within a pure regularity account to climb back down again”. The 
device we need includes the special force laws, which, I maintain, can not be rendered as statements of 
regularity. 
35 In my (1999) I dubbed situations like this ‘nomological machines’. This is to highlight both the need to 
eliminate interference, which I have stressed in this discussion, and the need to have the right kind of 
internal structure (one for which there are rules about how the contributions of the parts combine), which I 
do not discuss here.  
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